Schweizer 269C-1 crash near Ozark, AL, United States

HISTORY OF FLIGHT On May 30, 2020, about 1132 central daylight time, a Schweizer 269C-1 helicopter, N9421P was destroyed when it was involved in an accident near Ozark, Alabama. The student pilot was fatally injured. The helicopter was operated as a Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) Part 91 instructional flight. About 0900, on the day of the accident, the student pilot met his flight instructor at Eagle Aviation Academy, which was located at a private heliport in Midland, Alabama. According to the student pilot's flight instructor, prior to the lesson, the flight instructor pushed the helicopter out of the hangar and performed a preflight inspection. Afterwards, the flight instructor and the student pilot did a final weather check and then the instructor waited on the student pilot while the student pilot also conducted a preflight. When the student pilot was done with his preflight, they took off about 0906. They started off with confined area exercises including two steep approaches and two maximum performance takeoffs. Afterward, they came back to a grass field near the flight school and the flight instructor demonstrated one straight in autorotation, followed by the student pilot performing two straight in autorotations. Then they transitioned to another nearby field, and they did two, 180° autorotations. They landed back at the flight school about 1035 after about 1.4 hours of flight time. The flight instructor performed a post flight walk around and they "topped it off with fuel." The flight instructor then went into his office and waited for the student pilot to finish his preflight. Once he finished his preflight, they talked about his solo flight which would be a 1.1-hour long flight, staying in the local area and doing a couple normal approaches and takeoffs at Ozark-Blackwell Field Airport (71J), Ozark, Alabama that they used regularly for training. They also looked at the weather and then the student pilot took off about 1110. Motion activated security cameras at 71J, next captured the helicopter performing takeoffs and landings on runway 31 about 1115, and then around 1131. The helicopter was next observed by a witness over a tree line in a residential area about 1 mile off the departure end of runway 31. According to the witness, the helicopter was "sputtering", then it was observed to turn back in the direction it had come from, the engine sounds ceased, and the helicopter dove rapidly and impacted the ground. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The student pilot held a commercial pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single-engine land, airplane multi-engine land, and instrument airplane. His most recent Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) second-class medical certificate was issued on February 15, 2019, at which time he reported 340 total hours of flight experience. The flight instructor stated that the student pilot had accrued about 66.9 total hours of flight time through the flight school, that he had provided 26.3 hours of dual instruction to the student pilot. The flight instructor also advised that the student pilot had accrued 8.9 hours of solo flight time in helicopters, and estimated that the student pilot would need 7 more hours of dual flight training before taking his checkride. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION A review of FAA and helicopter maintenance records revealed that the helicopter was manufactured in 2000. A logbook entry dated July 10, 2018, indicated that the helicopter was purchased in non-flyable storage condition and was reassembled using various new, reconditioned, and overhauled components. The helicopter's most recent 50-hour inspection was completed on April 4, 2020 (about 56 days before the accident). At the time of the inspection, the helicopter had accrued 5,387.4 total hours of operation, and the engine had accrued 1,720 hours of operation since major overhaul. Postaccident examination of the helicopter revealed that a tail rotor gearbox (P/N z369-A-5400 “E”, S/N 87083) manufactured for Hughes Tool Company by Western Gear Corporation (which predated the date of manufacture of the helicopter) was installed. According to the FAA Type Certificate Data Sheet, this component was prohibited for use on the helicopter, was not listed in the manufacturer’s illustrated parts catalog for the helicopter, and was not listed in Schweizer’s Mandatory Service Notice (N-229.1), which addressed part number conversions from McDonnell Douglas (Hughes) 369 series parts to Schweizer 269 series parts. According to the Schweizer 269C-1 Rotorcraft Flight Manual, if the amber FUEL LOW caution light came on in flight, approximately one gallon of usable fuel remained in the fuel tank. It instructed that, “If fuel low caution light comes on during flight, land immediately.” WRECKAGE AND IMPACT INFORMATION Examination of the accident site revealed no evidence of any fire or explosion. The helicopter impacted a 60- to 70-foot-tall tree before coming to rest. Tree limbs up to about 8 inches in diameter were broken and were found lying within and on the wreckage. A significant amount of oil was leaking from the engine. The main rotor blades remained attached to the hub and displayed upward bending and chordwise wrinkling. The leading edges of the blades were predominantly undisturbed and the control rods to the main rotor hub remained connected. The tail boom was separated from its mounting location and was found near the main wreckage. The tail rotor was still connected to the tail rotor gearbox and the tail rotor gearbox remained attached to the tailboom, which displayed minimal damage. The instrument panel was bent forward. The panel light switch was in the “OFF” position, the beacon and position light switches were in the “ON” position, and the battery and alternator switches were in the “ON” position. The carburetor heat control lever was found to be about 1-inch travel from the “OFF” position stop, the fuel mixture control was in the “FULL RICH” position, the fuel shutoff control was in the off position (full in), and the magneto key switch was in the “BOTH” position. The trim switch was in the “RIGHT” position, the clutch control switch guard was open, and the clutch control switch was in the “ENGAGE” position. The circuit breakers for the trim, and clutch were both in. The fuel low caution light system was placarded as inoperative. The 33-gallon fuel tank was impact damaged, there was no evidence of residual fuel, and the fuel tank filler cap was found hanging by its chain. The carburetor was impact damaged, and its float bowl was devoid of fuel. There was no odor of fuel, and no observed fuel blight (browning of vegetation) in the vicinity of the wreckage. The airframe and all flight critical components were accounted for. All four landing gear dampers were accounted for as well as the landing gear skids. The frame assembly had separated into multiple individual pieces. No evidence of failure was evident on all four of the cluster fittings. Both lower mast attach members were still attached to the mast and the airframe. The center mast attach fitting was separated at the mast attachment after retrieval from the wreckage site. The floor was separated from the cabin seat deck. The vertical fin was crushed, and the horizontal fin was separated from the helicopter. The leading edge of the horizontal fin displayed dents consistent with striking foliage. The left seat belt system was still in place inside the helicopter while the right seat belt system was broken at its attach points. Both seat assemblies and interior components were accounted for. The instrument panel was intact but crushed in the back. The right control stick was broken at the fitting. The left control stick was not broken at the fitting. Both collective sticks were installed and accounted for. The cyclic control was connected from both left and right sides to the swashplate assembly, but was not connected fore and aft due to an impact-frac